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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , * Case No. 860116 
- v - i 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN, : P r i o r i t y No. 2 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Bruce Dallas Goodman, was charged with 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted as charged in a bench trial 
held January 29-30, 1986, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
in and for Beaver County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Burns 
on January 30, 1986, to a term of five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 30 November 1984 at about 9:30 a.m., the body of 
Sherry Ann Fales Williams was found near the Manderfield exit on 
Interstate 15 in Beaver County (T. 42-44). Except for her socks, 
Sherry Williams was naked from the waist down. Her hands were 
tied behind her back, and her ankles were tied together (T. 64-
67). Her death had been occasioned by multiple blows to the head 
with a blunt instrument—at l e a s t f i v e blows had been i n f l i c t e d 
upon the l e f t s ide of the head, and a t l e a s t three had been 
i n f l i c t e d upon the r ight s ide (T. 3 0 - 3 1 ) . From i n j u r i e s t o one 
of the v i c t i m ' s hands, medical experts surmised that she had been 
conscious and had attempted t o ward off some of the i n i t i a l blows 
(T. 3 1 ) . In addi t ion to l a c e r a t i o n s and tears to the face and 
s c a l p of the v ic t im (T. 2 4 ) , the v i c t i m ' s anus had been torn by 
the f o r c i b l e entry of an object (T. 35 -36) . Seminal f l u i d in the 
v i c t i m ' s vagina es tab l i shed that she had had sexual intercourse 
within the previous 24-36 hours (T. 9 9 ) . Found near the body was 
a partial ly-smoked Benson & Hedges menthol c i g a r e t t e , the type 
smoked by Sherry Williams (T. 67, 72 , 117) . The record 
e s tab l i shed the fol lowing as t o the circumstances of Sherry 
Williams' death: 
Defendant met Sherry Williams during the l a t t e r part of 
October 1984, a t a f a i r in Phoenix, Arizona (T. 343) . Defendant 
had obtained a job a t the f a i r s e l l i n g hatpins and souvenirs for 
a man named Lloyd Howell, and the v i c t im was working at the "dime 
pitch" (T. 344)* Defendant and the v ic t im began l i v i n g together 
almost immediately upon meeting one another (T. 344) . Shortly 
therea f t er , the two of them went to Nevada. On 5 November 1984, 
they moved i n t o the L i t t l e Hotel in Las Vegas (T. 118-20) . 
Defendant obtained a job with Snyder and Sons, I n c . , a hay and 
grain business owned by Mr. Frank Snyder (T. 125-26) . During the 
next two weeks, Mr. Snyder allowed defendant to drive h i s 1983, 
white , Ford pickup. The pickup had "Snyder & Sons, Inc ." painted 
on both s i d e s as wel l as temporary s igns on both s i d e s 
advert i s ing "Hay For Sale" (T. 122, 129) . 
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On 19 November 1984, defendant asked Mr. Snyder's 
permission to borrow the Ford pickup in order to move his 
belongings to a new hotel (T. 131). Defendant never returned the 
truck to Mr. Snyder (T. 131), and later that day Mr. Snyder 
reported the truck stolen (T. 127). On that same day, Mr. Snyder 
found that several items were missing from his ranch; and at 
trial defendant admitted that he had stolen the pickup and a 
"chain saw, a drill, a jigsaw . . . a set of tires, Ford rims, 
17-inch tires. . . ." (T. 346). 
A few days later, defendant and Sherry Williams were 
seen in Beatty, Nevada, about 116 miles north of Las Vegas. 
Donald Dawson, who managed a Chevron station in Beatty, testified 
that defendant pulled into his service station, and Mr. Dawson 
identified the pickup belonging to Snyder and Sons as the vehicle 
defendant was driving (T. 149-50). Mr. Dawson saw tools, a chain 
saw, and one or two tires lying in the back of the truck, and 
defendant asked him if he wanted to buy the chain saw (T. 153). 
Mr. Dawson declined but noticed the "Hay For Sale" sign and said 
that he would be interested in buying some hay for his horses (T. 
153). Mr. Dawson stated that defendant was accompanied by a 
woman and identified pictures of Sherry Williams as those of the 
woman who was with defendant (T. 154) •* 
1
 Mr. Dawson was certain that he saw defendant "right close to" 
Thanksgiving Day. Mr. Dawson remembered that on that day he had 
divided the shift at work and had given his crew part of the day 
off (T. 156). The trial court took judicial notice that, in 
1984, Thanksgiving Day was on 22 November (T. 170). 
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Defendant and the v ic t im apparently spent a number of 
days i n Stockton, Cal i forn ia , v i s i t i n g with Lloyd Howell, the man 
for whom he had worked a t the f a i r in Arizona. By s t i p u l a t i o n i t 
was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t , from 20-25 November, Sherry Williams made a 
s e r i e s of long-dis tance telephone c a l l s from Stockton—to her 
mother in Maryland, and to her husband, Tom Will iams, in Murray, 
Utah (T. 267-70)• Defendant t e s t i f i e d that in these telephone 
c a l l s Sherry Williams made plans to return t o her husband and 
that she and defendant had heated arguments over her plans t o 
leave (T. 353-55)• 
Officer Gary Keuhl of the Las Vegas Pol ice Department 
t e s t i f i e d that near midnight on 29 November 1984, he found Frank 
Snyder's Ford pickup parked behind the Blue Diamond Union 76 
Truck Stop in Las Vegas (T. 163) . Both doors to the pickup were 
locked, and the keys were in the i g n i t i o n (T. 1 6 4 ) . Officer 
Keuhl s ta ted that the truck had not been there when he patro l l ed 
the same area twenty-four hours e a r l i e r (T. 1 6 4 ) . (The truck was 
returned to Mr. Snyder and, from h i s mileage records, Mr. Snyder 
ascertained that the pickup had been driven 800-1000 miles s ince 
i t had been s t o l e n on 19 November (T. 1 3 2 ) ) . Sharon Barnum, a 
cashier at the Blue Diamond Union 76 Truck Stop, t e s t i f i e d that 
at about midnight of that night—29 November 1984—she saw the 
v ic t im (who had been at the truck s top on previous occasions) 
arguing with a man. The man Ms. Barnum described matched 
defendant's descr ip t ion (T. 1 7 0 - 7 4 ) . 
A few hours l a t e r , defendant and Sherry Williams were 
seen at the Peppermill Casino in Mesquite, Nevada. Jeanie T. 
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White, who worked as a keno runner at the cas ino , t e s t i f i e d that 
defendant and Ms. Williams were in the Peppermill for at l e a s t an 
hour and a half during the early morning hours of 30 November 
1984• Defendant sat on a s too l next to one of the s l o t machines, 
without playing, and the v ic t im spent most of the time walking 
back and for th . Defendant and Sherry Williams began to argue 
with one another, and at one point they became so loud that Ms* 
White thought she might have to c a l l a secur i ty guard to put an 
end to the disturbance (T. 195-97, 228 ) . Sometime around 3:00-
4:00 a.m., defendant and Sherry Williams l e f t the Peppermill (T. 
195, 2 1 5 ) . 
As noted above, Sherry Williams1 bludgeoned body was 
found la t er that morning near the Manderfield e x i t in Beaver 
County (T. 4 2 - 4 4 ) . Tests conducted by the State Crime Lab 
e s tab l i shed that the semen which had recent ly been deposited in 
the v i c t i m ' s vagina had come from a male "secretor" with Type A 
blood (T. 88 ) . Sal iva t e s t s conducted by the crime lab a l so 
e s tab l i shed that the Benson & Hedges c i g a r e t t e found near the 
v i c t i m ' s body had been smoked by a Type A secre tor . Martha Kerr, 
from the State Crime Lab, t e s t i f i e d that defendant was a Type A 
secretor and that about 32% of the population are Type A 
secre tors (T. 85-88, 1 0 1 ) . Sherry Williams' blood was type 0 (T. 
8 4 ) . Frank Snyder t e s t i f i e d that the rope used to bind the 
v i c t i m ' s l e g s was of the same type and diameter as rope he kept 
in large q u a n t i t i e s at the Snyder ranch (T. 102, 139-41) . 
At t r i a l defendant waived h i s r ight to a jury (T. 2 ) , 
and Judge J. Harlan Burns found defendant g u i l t y of murder in the 
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second degree (T. 3 9 1 ) . Defendant received a sentence of f i v e 
years to l i f e in the Utah State Prison (T. 394) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There was adequate evidence presented from which the 
t r i a l court could have concluded that Sherry Williams had been 
murdered and that defendant was the perpetrator . 
Pre tr ia l photo i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedures were not so 
impermissibly suggest ive as t o give r i s e to a very substant ia l 
l i k e l i h o o d of irreparable mis ident i f i c a t i o n . Therefore, 
defendant's argument that he was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight 
of due process i s without merit . 
The t r i a l court neither denied defendant any 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight to speak in h i s own behalf, nor was he 
harmed by the c o u r t ' s refusing t o hear from him after the verdict 
was rendered. Moreover, defendant waived h i s r ight t o ra i se t h i s 
i s sue by f a i l i n g t o make a proper object ion a t t r i a l . 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO CONVICT DEFENDANT. 
Defendant's claim that there was not sufficient 
evidence presented at trial to convict him is without merit. 
As pointed out in State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1985), where a defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain his conviction, the standard of review is narrow. 
"[Wle review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbably that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State 
v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 442f 444 (1983); 
accord. State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the conviction, 
we do not substitute our judgment for that of 
the jury. "It is the exclusive function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses . . . ." 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
accordt State v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983). So long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. 
id. at 345. 
A. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE GENERALLY. 
At trial, defendant claimed that he remained in 
Stockton, California, from 20 November until 3 December 1984, and 
that he neither killed Sherry Williams nor was anywhere near the 
scene of her death on 30 November 1984. There was abundant 
evidence from which the trial court could have concluded 
otherwise. 
The eyewitness testimony establishing that defendant 
was with the victim during the night that she was murdered was 
persuasive. Jeanie White, the keno runner at the Peppermill in 
Mesquite, provided compelling testimony. For at least an hour 
and a half, between 2:00-4:00 a.m., defendant sat at a slot 
machine near where Ms. White was working (T. 194-96). In making 
her keno rounds, Ms. White walked directly past defendant every 
five to eight minutes (T. 197), and there were several reasons 
why he stood out in her mind. First, there was a loud argument 
between defendant and Sherry Williams which attracted Ms. White's 
attention. She kept an eye on them, thinking that she might have 
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t o c a l l a s ecur i ty guard t o s top the disturbance (T. 196 f 223 ) . 
Second, Ms. White t e s t i f i e d that customers at the Pepperroill, 
even the truckers , tended t o be washed and c lean . Defendant had 
a short growth of beard, and he was not iceable because of h i s 
exceptional d i r t i n e s s (T. 198, 2 0 5 ) . Third, Ms. White's 
a t t e n t i o n was drawn t o a l e v i ves t—or jacket with the arms torn 
out—worn by defendant: there were a number of pins and buttons 
attached to i t and, hanging from the jacke t , was an unusual 
leather thong or "choker" which held a medallion of some sort (T. 
198, 199) . This jacket (with i t s s l e e v e s torn out , buttons , 
leather choker, and medallion) was i d e n t i f i e d by Ms. White at 
t r i a l and was shown to have belonged to defendant ( S t a t e ' s 
Exhibit No. 28; T. 198-200) . Furthermore, defendant stood out in 
Ms. w h i t e ' s mind, because he merely sat next t o a s l o t machine, 
without playing i t or any other of the games. Except for 
occas iona l ly ta lk ing or arguing with the v i c t im , defendant did 
nothing (T. 1 2 3 ) . Ms. White added that the graveyard s h i f t i s 
normally "dead" and that there were very few people in the casino 
on the night in quest ion (T. 1 9 4 ) . She made a p o s i t i v e 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant in court (T. 201) and, in rendering 
h i s v e r d i c t , Judge Burns s p e c i f i c a l l y found that Ms. White's 
testimony was persuasive (T. 391) . 
The testimony of Sharon Barnum, the cashier at the Blue 
Diamond Truck Stop, was a l so s i g n i f i c a n t . Ms. Barnum t e s t i f i e d 
that Sherry Williams had been a t the truck s top on previous 
occas ions , and Ms. Barnum i d e n t i f i e d a photo of the v ic t im as the 
person she saw at the truck s top at around midnight on 29 
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November 1984 (T. 173) • The victim was arguing with a man, and 
while Ms. Barnum could not positively identify the man, her 
description fit defendant: she remembered that the man was 
wearing a levi vest and had tatoos on his arms (T. 174). At 
trial, defendant was asked to display his arms. At first, Ms. 
Barnum said she thought the man she saw had more tatoos, then she 
said that she could not be sure if the tatoos were different (T. 
177). The record reflected, however, that defendant did indeed 
have tatoos on both arms and both hands (T. 177). 
The testimony of other State witnesses further tended 
to establish that defendant was traveling with Sherry Williams to 
Utah, rather than being in Stockton as he claimed. When he took 
the witness stand, defendant admitted that he had stolen the Ford 
pickup, tools and other items from Mr. Snyder on 19 November 1984 
(T. 346). Defendant claimed, however, that he immediately sold 
the stolen items in Las Vegas and that, still on 19 November 
1984, he abandoned Frank Snyder's pickup at the Blue Diamond 
Truck Stop, and then with Sherry Williams began hitching rides to 
California (T. 346-47). However, Donald Dawson, the manager of 
the Chevron station in Beatty, Nevada, positively identified 
defendant as the man he saw driving the Snyder pickup on about 22 
November 1984 (T 154). Mr. Dawson accurately described the 
pickup truck, with its "Snyder & Sons, Inc." and "Hay For Sale" 
signs (T. 156). He noticed tools, tires and a chain saw similar 
to those stolen from the Snyder ranch (T. 153). He recognized 
defendant's sleeveless levi jacket with its peculiar pins and 
buttons (T. 152). And Mr. Dawson recognized a photograph of 
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Sherry Williams as the woman who was accompanying defendant (T. 
154 ) . Officer Gary Keuhl t e s t i f i e d that , on the night of 29 
November 1984, he found Mr. Frank Snyder's pickup parked behind 
the Blue Diamond Truck Stop, and that the truck had not been 
there twenty-four hours e a r l i e r (T. 163-64)* Mr. Snyder's 
records indicated that h i s pickup had been driven 800-1000 miles 
between the time i t was s to l en and the time i t was recovered (T. 
132) . The combined testimony of Frank Snyder, Off icer Gary 
Keuhl, Donald Dawson, and Sharon Barnum provided strong 
c ircumstantial evidence that defendant had not remained in 
Stockton, but had driven with the v ic t im to Las Vegas in the 
Snyder truck on the night she was murdered. 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n a t the scene of the murder produced 
further evidence of defendant's g u i l t . Defendant was a "Type A 
secretor" (as i s only 32% of the populat ion) , and Sherry Williams 
had had recent sexual intercourse with a Type A secretor (T. 85-
88 , 1 0 1 ) . A Benson and Hedges c i g a r e t t e , the type smoked by the 
v i c t i m , was found near the body and had been smoked by a Type A 
secretor (T. 1 0 1 ) . And the rope used t o t i e the v i c t i m ' s l e g s 
was the same type and diameter of rope that was kept in large 
q u a n t i t i e s a t the Snyder Ranch (T. 102 , 139 -41 ) . 
Defendant had a motive for k i l l i n g Sherry Will iams. He 
admitted t h a t , against h i s wishes , she was planning t o leave him 
and return to her husband. Defendant and the v ic t im had had 
angry arguments over her plans t o leave (T. 353 -54 ) . And 
defendant f e l t that Sherry Williams had been "using" him (T. 
354) . 
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There was evidence tha t defendant had engaged in 
v io len t ac t s on previous occasions (T. 343). Alsof i t appeared 
tha t even prior to the v i c t im ' s decision to leave defendant, 
t he i r r e l a t ionsh ip had been tempestuous: there had been heated 
a l t e r c a t i o n s , and on one occasion the victim hurled a pair of 
s c i s so r s a t defendant, and he threw her out of the i r hotel room 
(T. 3 6 4 ) . 
Defendant's defense of a l i b i was not persuasive. He 
and three members of the Lloyd Howell family s ta ted tha t he was 
in Stockton, Cal i fornia , and could not have been near the scene 
of the murder. The t r i a l court could eas i ly have disbelieved 
defendant 's own se l f -serving testimony. Defendant had a lengthy 
criminal record involving crimes of s tea l ing and dishonesty (T. 
343), he was shown to have l i ed to h i s employer Frank Snyder (T. 
365), and he had committed a var ie ty of dishonest ac ts during the 
time tha t he and Sherry Williams were together (seey e.g.> T. 
346, 361). 
From the cold record now before t h i s Court, i t i s l e s s 
c lear why the t r i a l court refused to believe the testimony of 
Lloyd Howell, h i s son Kenneth, and Kenneth's wife Tina, There 
were, however, ind ica t ions that people in the carnival business 
(as were the Howells) had a reputat ion for lying to protect each 
other (T. 300); tha t in August of 1985 a t l e a s t one of the 
Howells could not remember the exact days t ha t defendant had been 
in Stockton and, a f o r t i o r i , could not have reca l led those dates 
a t defendant 's t r i a l in January of 1986 (T. 304); and t h a t the 
Howells became cer ta in of relevant dates and events only after 
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they had met together and discussed the matter among themselves 
(T. 283)• 
After hearing the evidence, Judge Burns made the 
following findings: 
The Court finds no problems with the place 
[of death] being Beaver County, State of Utah, 
Manderfield exit. 
The Court finds, in tracing the thread of 
testimony, finds the testimony of Mr. Snyder, 
Mr. Dawson, the witness Barn urn and the witness 
Keuhl, persuasive on the facts that they have 
testified, that may be somewhat in dispute 
with other witnesses. 
The Court finds that that pickup truck, 
beyond any doubt, was in Beatty, Nevada 
sometime between the 20th and the 29th of 
November, 1984. 
The Court further is persuaded that the 
witness Dawson in fact saw the accused in the 
company of the victim. 
The Court is persuaded that on November 29th, 
from the testimony of the witness Keuhl, the 
officer, that the truck was back at the Blue 
Diamond Truck Stop. 
I am persuaded that it wasn't there before. 
That is in direct contradiction of the testimony 
of the accused and also testimony and evidence 
of other witnesses. 
The Court is also persuaded that in the 
early-morning hours of November 30thf the 
defendant, and accused, was in the company of 
the deceased in Mesquite, Nevada. 
The Court is persuaded that the testimony 
of Jeanie White, including the trinkets on the 
jacket, that was observed by her on the person 
of the defendant, and the choker, that was 
part of that jacket, was the property of the 
victim, identified by the witness White. 
Now, I point those things out to you. 
The Court finds the defendant guilty as 
charged. 
(T. 390-92). 
Based upon the evidence before the t r i a l court , these 
conclus ions were proper. 
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B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE COURT1S 
FINDING THAT SHERRY WILLIAMS HAD 
BEEN MURDERED. 
In Point IV of h i s br ie f , defendant argues that the 
evidence was not adequate t o e s t a b l i s h that the k i l l e r of Sherry 
Williams acted with the s t a t e of mind needed t o support a 
convict ion of murder in the second degree. Defendant urges that 
the t r i a l court could have concluded that the v i c t i m ' s death was 
brought about by behavior that was merely reck le s s and that he 
should only have been convicted of manslaughter. This argument 
i s m e r i t l e s s . 
First, the evidence was certainly sufficient to 
establish the mental element necessary to support a conviction of 
murder in the second degree. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978) 
states in relevant part: 
Murder in the second degree.—(1) Criminal 
homicide constitutes murder in the second 
degree if the actor: (a) Intentionally 
or knowingly causes the death of another; 
or . . . (c) Acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human 
lifef he recklessly engaged in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of 
another . . . . 
The victim in the instant case was found with her hands and legs 
bound. Her head had been battered several times with a blunt 
object, and injuries to her hand indicated that she had attempted 
to ward of the blows. Under these circumstances, the trial court 
could properly have concluded that the perpetrator acted 
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i n t e n t i o n a l l y , knowingly, or with depraved i n d i f f e r e n c e . 2 
Indeed, i t would have been strange for the court to have 
concluded otherwise . 
Moreover, defendant's argument—that "the evidence in 
t h i s case supports the equally reasonable theory that the 
perpetrator of the attack upon Sherry Ann Fales Williams caused 
her death only r e c k l e s s l y which would c o n s t i t u t e Manslaughter. • 
. ." (Brief for Appellant a t 1 6 ) — a v a i l s him nothing. Defendant 
seems to have forgot ten the Petree standard of appe l la te review, 
s e t forth in Point I of h i s br ie f . The i s sue i s not whether a 
reck le s sness theory i s "equally reasonable" t o the theory of 
murder in the second degree, but whether the t r i a l court must 
have concluded from the evidence that the perpetrator acted with 
mere reck le s sness and not i n t e n t i o n a l l y , knowingly, or with 
depraved i n d i f f e r e n c e . See S ta te v. Petree , 659 P.2d at 444. 
See a l so State v . Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. Under the 
circumstances of t h i s case , the argument that the t r i a l court 
must have concluded that the perpetrator acted with mere 
r e c k l e s s n e s s i s untenable. 
And f i n a l l y , defendant's argument should be r e j e c t e d , 
because he waived h i s r ight t o ra i s e t h i s i s sue on appeal by 
f a i l i n g t o address the matter at t r i a l . At no time in the 
proceedings below did defendant claim that the evidence supported 
a charge of recklessness /manslaughter . Indeed t h i s theory would 
2 in rendering the v e r d i c t , Judge Burns declared: The Court, of 
course, f inds no d i f f i c u l t y that the l i f e of Sherry Ann Fales 
Williams was taken by means of murder. The Court f inds the time 
was November 30 , 1984. (T. 390) . 
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have undermined h i s de fense of a l i b i . In h i s opening s ta tement 
a t t r i a l , de fense counse l d e c l a r e d : 
MR. SHUMATE: Y e s , Your Honor, May i t 
p l e a s e the Court and c o u n s e l : Your Honor, 
our ev idence w i l l b a s i c a l l y show t h a t t h e r e 
i s not a d i s p u t e from the de fense s t a n d p o i n t 
t h a t Sherry Ann F a l e s Wi l l iams was t r a g i c a l l y 
murdered a t a l o c a t i o n , t h a t we b e l i e v e , i n 
a way, as b e s t t h e ev idence can show, north 
of Beaver a t the Manderf ie ld e x i t . We d o n ' t 
have any ev idence t o t h e contrary and we 
f r a n k l y b e l i e v e she was i n f a c t k i l l e d t h e r e . 
The d i s p u t e i s a s t o who did i t . (T. 1 0 ) . 
Defendant f a i l e d t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e of manslaughter a t t r i a l and 
even conceded t h a t t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o support such a c l a i m . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , he may not now r a i s e t h i s i s s u e on a p p e a l . S t a t e v . 
S t e g g e l l , 660 P.2d 2 5 2 , 254 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; S t a t e v . P i e r r e n , 583 
P.2d 6 9 , 71 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Because t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t 
t r i a l t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Sherry Wi l l i ams was murdered and t h a t 
defendant was t h e p e r p e t r a t o r , d e f e n d a n t ' s argument should be 
r e j e c t e d . 
POINT I I 
PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWN TO WITNESS JEANIE WHITE 
DURING THE INVESTIGATORY STAGES OF THE 
PRESENT CASE DID NOT SO TAINT HER 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AS TO DEPRIVE 
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
Defendant c l a i m s t h a t , because w i t n e s s J e a n i e White was 
shown c e r t a i n photographs pr ior t o t r i a l , her t e s t imony a t t r i a l 
v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of due p r o c e s s . At t r i a l , the 
S t a t e d id not i n t r o d u c e any ev idence of the p r e t r i a l photo 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , t h e only i s s u e here i s whether the 
photographs so t a i n t e d Ms. W h i t e ' s t e s t imony t h a t , a s a matter of 
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due process, she should not have been allowed to testify. There 
was no due process violation in the present case. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD SET FORTH 
BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. 
In the leading case of Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court addressed the defendant's 
claim that the use of an unduly suggestive photo array prior to 
trial violated his right of due process. In an opinion by 
Justice Harlan, the Court acknowledged the possibility that 
showing photographs to witnesses might cause them to err in 
identifying criminal suspects. Xd. at 384. Nevertheless, the 
Court recognized the validity of pretrial photographic 
identification stating that "this procedure has been used widely 
and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint 
both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects 
the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them 
through scrutiny of photographs." XJ|. The Court then set forth 
the constitutional standard by which photo identification 
procedures should be judged: 
We are unwilling to prohibit [the employment of 
photographic identification], either in the 
exercise of our supervisory power or, still 
less, as a matter of constitutional requirement. 
Instead, we hold that each case must be 
considered on its own facts, and that convictions 
based on eyewitness identification at trial 
following a pretrial identification by photograph 
will be set aside on that ground only if the 
photographic identification procedure was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. The standard accords with 
our resolution of a similar issue in stovall v. 
Denno, and with decisions of other courts on 
the question of identification by photograph. 
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Id. ( footnote and c i t a t i o n omit ted) . Thus, in the present case , 
defendant's r ight to due process under the United S t a t e s 
Constitution was violated only if the identification procedure 
was so suggestive that it gave rise to a "very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." This did not occur 
in the pretrial proceedings of this case. 
B. THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES USED IN 
THE PRESENT CASE. 
Defendant states in his brief that Ms. White was "shown 
a photo lineup consisting of six photographs. In that line up 
[sic] three were of Mr. Goodman or his composite drawing . . . ." 
(Brief for Appellant at 13). Defendant conveys the impression 
that Ms. White was shown six photographs in a single array and 
that three of those six involved defendant. This is a 
misrepresentation of the record. The uncontroverted testimony as 
to the photo identification procedure employed by the police is 
as follows: 
First, there was an initial stage of the investigation 
in which Sheriff's Deputies from Beaver County made a series of 
trips to Nevada. They took with them a number of photographs 
including a photo of a composite drawing of the defendant. These 
pictures were shown to a number of individuals to ascertain 
whether they could recognize either defendant or the victim 
(Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing (hereinafter, "Prelim. 
Hrg.") at 220-23). In an initial contact with Ms. White, during 
January or February of 1985, Deputy Kelly Davis showed Ms. White 
the photograph of the composite drawing of defendant (Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing (hereinafter, "Suppress. Hrg.") at 18-
-17-
2 0 ) . 3 No photo array, nor any other photo of defendant was shown 
Ms. White a t t h i s t ime. 
About a month l a t e r , Deputy Davis and Deputy Raymond 
Goodwin presented a photo array to Ms. White (Suppress. Hrg. at 
2 0 - 2 1 ) . The array included four photographs, one being that of 
defendant. And Ms. White s e l e c t e d the photograph of defendant as 
the man she saw on the night in quest ion ( id . at 2 3 , 5 8 - 5 9 ) . 4 
Both Deputy Goodwin and Jeanie White t e s t i f i e d that she was not 
shown the photograph of the composite drawing on the same v i s i t 
that the photo array was shown her. At the preliminary hearing, 
Deputy Goodwin s t a t e d , "At the time we done a l ineup , the photo 
composite was not in there . There was Mr. Goodman's photograph 
in there and t h a t ' s the one she picked out ." (Prelim. Hrg. at 
210) . And the record of the suppression hearing r e f l e c t s the 
fo l lowing: 
Q. (By Mr. Shumate) Mrs. White, the 
photographs that you were shown, were they 
shown to you immediately after the composite 
was shown to you? 
A. No. 
Q. When were you shown the other 
photographs? 
A. I t was on the nexc v i s i t . 
Q. All r i gh t . So a t the time, what 
we have ca l l ed the second v i s i t in January, 
February, you were shown only a composite 
at that time? 
A. Correct. 
3 This photograph of the composite drawing was admitted i n t o 
evidence a t the Suppression Hearing, as P l a i n t i f f 1 s Exhibit No. 
6 , and i s included in the appe l la te record. 
* The photo array was admitted at the suppression hearing, as 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit Nos. 2 - 5 , and i s a l so included in the 
appe l la te record. Exhibit No. 3 i s the picture of defendant. 
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Q, And t h a t was a i.orii|x>site showi'i t o 
you by Deputy K e 1 1 y Pav i B
 t i b t h -" 1 i i qht ? 
A. Y e s . 
( S u p p r e s s , Hn i a t i t ) J . 
And f i n a l l y , on t h e same v i s i t t h a t Mi, W h i t e was shown 
t i n (i l l in I 1 in mi mi I 1 llhi in i l i i n mi I in i" i i In i I « I ill Hi IJ II i in t i P o l a r n i c i 
s n a p s h o t uf d e f e n d a n t , " PII , IIKIII HI I I a f f i r m e d t h a i t h i s wai. 
s h e h a d s e e n on t h e n i g h t t hi v i c t i m was m u r d e r e d , JI it- a i n 
i i L mi HIM J LLI J i J I Hi 11 I llliii I nil in 1 i mi ill I 1111 [i* lii I I lid1 in I | 1 i i ml ed t o 
Ms. W h i t e a s p a r t of p h o t o a r r a y a n d was shown l i t ^ . . 1 , a l t e r s h e 
had s e l e c t e d d e f e n d a n t * f p i c t u r e from t h e a r r a y ( i d , a t 6 2 - 6 3 ) . 
C THE LAW AFPJ II III 'IN 'III I I I I ' i 'III IF 
THIS CASE, 
( I HI i lii i I u ml lit tuyi j i 'M i v ei iei \ i II i I! 11 il i 
p r o c e d u r e s "must be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t ut t h t t o t a l i t y of 
i i M I * i ii i % i i iiii r l t\n mt ; " ' ' immons v» Una t e d S t a t e s , 390 U . S . 
a t i t l j ( t i t i n q M u v d l l v , D e n n o , 388 U .£ \ 7 9 1 , III,11 III I Mil In 
a s s e s s i n g t h e t o t a l i t y of Hie sue r o u n d i ng t i r c u m s t a n c e s r t r e 
I | " i i i i I in in i i i o n s i d e r e d a number of 
f a c t o r s : 
F i r s t , it ib impor tan t t o consici if the w i t n c s i s ' b 
i I Il i i r v 1 I i in i m i I I 11 MI i in I 1 if 1 he w i t n e s s 
g l i m p s e d t h e s u s p e c t only b r i e f l y oi J • I b • I 11 m under poor 
ronrii f i cnsi, t h e r e ib a g r e a t e i i i s k of "lining s u g g e s t i v e n e s s and 
Jii in h i i l i nit in I i i all i m i I II I I mi I I II ii in II i i i f" r* n t i h f II \ i ill I I H J f . u n p e c t a t 
length under t a v o i a b i e nuiicj J u OILS , See IJJ. o\ UIII I i*inq 
* This Po loro id snapshot was not in t roduced as evidence a t it :ie 
Suppress ion Hearing and i s not inc luded i n the a p p e l l a t e record* 
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i s o l a t e d statements out of context , defendant suggests that Ms. 
White's a t t e n t i o n was never focused on the suspect and that she 
looked at him only b r i e f l y . However, the complete record in t h i s 
case demonstrates that the circumstances were otherwise , that Ms. 
White observed defendant a t length under except iona l ly favorable 
circumstances. As noted above, defendant sa t in the Peppermill 
for at l e a s t an hour and a ha l f , and Ms. White walked past him on 
her keno rounds every f i v e t o e ight minutes. At the suppression 
hearing, Ms. White t e s t i f i e d that she walked past defendant 25-40 
times (Suppress. Hrg. a t 5 3 ) . Ms. White est imated that she 
looked d i r e c t l y at defendant for a t o t a l of about 8-10 seconds 
( id . at 26 ) . At the preliminary hearing, Ms. White s ta ted that 
defendant and the v ic t im "seemed to get i n t o a domestic quarre l . 
And t h a t ' s when I kept a good eye because I f igured I would have 
to c a l l s e c u r i t y . " (Prelim. Hrg. at 1 8 8 ) . Defendant stood out 
because of h i s unusually d ir ty appearance. Defendant's v e s t with 
i t s buttons and " l i t t l e doo j i g s " a t t rac ted her a t t en t ion ( id . at 
183) . Ms. White not iced the leather "choker" hanging from 
defendant's j a c k e t , and she s tated she had never seen a choker 
- 2 0 -
h a n g i n g l i k e thd t 1 i OHI a ves t bef or v (iiiippr e s s , Hrg. a t 52 1 r"" 
j ii I l 111 I l"l i I .I1 i, I .I (t .1 t Li . I wi. i l i " .1 If "I i1 II, 11 i„l 1 >.u. i I I I hi" il 't ' i ' i 'f11 in i 11 
t h e l i g h t i n g w a b • v e i y b I i g 111, • because a J I t h tj J i y h t, t;» i r i 11! i e 
caBino had been t i n n e d on I oi c l e a n i n g , winch if. done d u r i n g Lhe 
1,11 iPi , V i l l i Ill ( i l l ) in I! II III mi Ill r i l l I 1 ' ) II I ' i i i III III I in i l i in ml II ( in II, -i I in ' in in . -
procedures employed in t h i s case had been improperly sugges t i ve - -
v* > a t - be eh' *- * f Court could conclude 
l ^ W U b t I I) 
o b s e r v e d e f e n d a n t , ( l i n e was i l l t i e l i v e l i h o o d of 
m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and I lim r of or v mm rlnm 'il nt rlui proet bf, S.ee 
H a b e r s t r o h v . Muni i III I | | II I II III III Ill III III i I Ill loy< i 
where t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e u p ih i m p e r m i s s i b l y s u g g e s t i v e , (he 
i " > " i i Simmons * * jn*J^ > ^ 
the witness had amp] i opportunity lu obbeiit thi; suspect and 
there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification)• 
A c c o r d H u d s o n t , i i i a i k b u j i i , I II I I  ill III "III I III I I  I Il II 
M v s h o l o w s k v v . N e w Y o r k , 5 3 5 F . J i J I ' M , IVl I i\l L i r . 1 9 7 9 ) . 
6 Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t the l ea the r choker a t t ached t o h i s 
v e s t had belonged to Sherry Wil l iams. She had worn i t around her 
neck before giving i i In hum, in e a r l y Nrvmih'i of IQH4, ac a 
token of fondness (I , 3 1 2J , 
Tn h i s b r i e f defendant s t a t e s , "She U e a n i e White] a l s o 
t o have i d e n t i f i e d on the l e v i v e s t a bra ided p iece of 
1 * r e f e r r e d t o a s a "choker" . The S t a t e in t roduced a t t r i a l 
jraph showing the deceased wearing the choker. However, 
i: u b l e theory t h a t the Defendant took t h e chocker [ s i c ] 
i < deceased near the time of her death i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with 
w.e te^timonv Lr D a n n i e White. r 'Brief for Appel lant a t 1 3 ) . 
Defendant seems confused as t o the S t a t e ' s purpose i n 
i n t r o d u c i n g evidence about t h e choker . There i s no i n d i c a t i o n in 
the record tKi- the S t a t e ever t heo r i zed t h a t defendant took, the 
choker from h i s v i c t i m near the t ime he k i l l e d h e r . Ra ther , t he 
in format ion was p r e sen t ed , because J e a n i e Whi te 1 s a b i l i t y t o 
i d e n t i f y t h i s p e c u l i a r p iece of apparel on d e f e n d a n t ' s j a c k e t was 
h igh ly p e r s u a s i v e evidence t h a t defendant was a t the Peppermill 
with the v i c t i m on t h e n igh t she was murdered. 
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A second important factor to be considered is whether 
the identification procedures employed by the police were unduly 
suggestive* Viewed as objectively as possible, the 
identification procedures employed in this case appear to have 
been less than perfect, but by no means so suggestive as to 
create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. Addressing the photographs in the order that 
they were shown to Ms. White, nothing about the photo of the 
composite drawing seems to have been unduly suggestive. Such 
composites are routinely shown to potential witnesses during the 
early stages of a criminal investigation, and defendant neither 
argues nor is there any evidence that showing this composite to 
Jeanie White caused her to misidentify him in the photographic 
lineup or at trial. 
The photographic lineup appears to have been fair. 
Ideally, the police might have broadened the array, using five or 
more photographs instead of just four. And two of the four 
photos happened to be of the same person, a Robert Hooper. 
Nevertheless, the array was not unduly suggestive. There is no 
indication that Ms. White knew that two of the photographs were 
of the same person. From all appearances, these were four 
different men with similar characteristics: they were male, 
Caucasian, had light brown hair, appeared to be about medium 
build, and three of the four (including defendant) had mustaches 
and light facial hair. The record does not disclose why the 
array was not broader nor why two pictures of Robert Hooper were 
employed. It should be noted, however, that the courts generally 
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a f f o r d the p o l i c e a r e a s o n a b l e amot • ' t I t«' > I >li | " '" > | 
s i t u a t i o n s , whei t. thi* p o l i c e appeal t o be do iny the beet they can 
n mi I In (I I in« in f1-1 n in i i i I In ", II in i i ( ,' i in i i 11 „ Jpc OJJ] fj v , J* in w i J 1
 f 97 
M i c h , App, 287, ^94 N.W.i'd .1 11980) . 
il I in i unc l ea r f r om t i i e i eco r d w hy M & 1 fl1 i t e w a & eh o w 11 
llllii II i II in in ill i i ir i | ihl i i i l in If illlii f i mi I il. in it nl I i T eh '" had s e l e c t e d h i s 
p i c t u i i I in i II i l l i I | i | ioto c u i a y , II i i inn ill il » t i n s was do no i i i|i « " 
1
 d f ^ f i i t i e i i i|i i M t r r c e r t a i n t y I1 .1" ( l o i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n "v.ts 
t LLUuin i I i mi in I I i II mi II i in iii mi in 11 Tin I t iinl dpf fjridafil i n p r o v i d e d 
fue l to r h i s argument II I I lit1 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedures were 
s u g g e s t i v e , !1i i i i t ' t h H e s s , v i e w i n g t h o c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e ' 
I |, im i j i n l ^ i II ( III III < i l O 'I ' I I "I * ' T i n n y ' mi mi | III I j f»5 
Miapshot a m i d have caused i r r e p a r a b l e sr^a lent if i c a t i o n . As 
in tcd above, M Whit*' had had an e x c e p t o r i l ly good oppor tuni ty 
I. v obse rve du i c r . dan t , ' ..! i >, -, ; f t f l f L ]< ph ,i ,1I i r ^.f, 
mi II i i i " l i n k u p , ii I I I i d e n t i f y i n g de fcnc i i r i t i i c u i l , slue w i r 
"ii fi'io I nt f« I \ <i»rl iiiiii1" l l i r i l h f w<is t h o man sin had seen on t h e 
night in ques t ion (see i n t r a t h i s B u e t i\ i I "' 
• . t , iU.^ ouggesLi> i t , , , wore than une phcLograph of Lnii maS 
*n to Ms. White in a s i n g l e photo a r r a y , As is shown above, 
* ;~ not so . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, based upon t h e t o t a l i t y 
<.: rcumstances invo lved , c o u r t s have f r equen t ly r e j e c t e d 
i.ts of undue s u g g e s t i v e n e s s , even where t he wi tnes s had 
been shown nort than one photograph of the defendant i n the same 
photo a r r a y . See , e . g . , United S t a t e s v . Ravlor , 491 F.2d 1127, 
1131 (2d C i r . 1973) ( n i n e - p i c t u r e photo a r ray t h a t inc luded twi of 
the defendant found not t o be impermiss ib ly s u g g e s t i v e ) ; 
Commonwealth v. Loder, 4 Mass. App. 832, 351 N.E.2d 533 f 534 (1976) (no due p rocess v i o l a t i o n where two snapshots of defendant 
a c c i d e n t a l l y inc luded in a r ray of s ix t o ten pho tographs ) ; S t a t e 
v . Thompson. 59 N.J . 396 , 283 A.2d 513 , 522 (1971) (convic t ion 
upheld where two p i c t u r e s of the defendant were inc luded in a 
s e v e n- ph o t o a 11 - \ \ ) 
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Sign i f i can t ly , there i s no evidence tha t the deputies 
themselves did anything to increase the l ike l ihood of improper 
suggest iveness. Nothing suggests t h a t the deputies to ld Ms. 
White of the d e t a i l s of the case, commented on the photos in the 
array, or presented the photos in a way tha t might have caused 
defendant 's to stand out . Where, as here , the pol ice have acted 
with due propr ie ty , the courts have been espec ia l ly re luc tan t to 
reverse a criminal conviction on grounds tha t a photo array was 
suggest ive, .gee, e^q^, People v. Lawrence. 4 Cal.3d 273, 481 
P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr . 204 (1971), c e r t , denied, 407 U.S. 909 
(1972). 
I t i s a lso s ign i f ican t t h a t defense counsel had ample 
opportunity to cross-examine Ms. White and thus expose possible 
weaknesses or suggestiveness in the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . In Simmons 
v. United S t a t e s , the Supreme Court noted: 
The danger tha t the use of [photographs] may 
r e s u l t in convictions based on mis iden t i f i ca t ion 
may be subs t an t i a l l y lessened by a course of 
cross-examination a t t r i a l which exposes to 
the jury the method's po ten t ia l for e r ro r . 
390 U.S. a t 384. The Supreme Court found i t s ign i f i can t t h a t , 
notwithstanding cross-examination, the witnesses did not display 
any doubt about the i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of the defendant, i d . a t 
385. S imi lar ly , in the present case, even af te r defense counsel 
had cross-examined Ms. White a t the preliminary hearing and had 
cal led her to t e s t i f y a t the suppression hearing, she remained 
ce r t a in of her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The t r a n s c r i p t of the suppression 
hearing r e f l e c t s the following in te r roga t ion of Ms. White by 
defense counsel: 
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Q» t By Mr • S h 1111 a t e I But on t h a t bas i B 
you state that Mr. Goodman, seated here next 
to me, is the same person that you sav there • 
that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There 's no question in your mind 
about looking l i ke a similar person? 
A. No, s i r . 
Q. You're absolutely cer ta in? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Q. Mrs, White, you un.de 1:stand that 
this is a case alleging capital homicide 
that carries a death penalty. Do you 
understand that? 
A Yes j sj i:» 
(Suppress. Hrg. at 38), 
PiL II I I ( !' ' H I "i III, 1  ill" 11 V I Il I II I I i l l II III ill Il III 
g e n e r a l l y been unsym]M I I 1 t i 1: t o d e f e n d a n t s a t t a c k i n g t h e 
s u g g e s t i v e n e s s of photc ini |i| 1 1 lent i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s . " I l 
] ' \VAl "I1 I I I h h A U . , s M H I N M . J Kin" 1:! 1JIII I '" I I M I N I M I , T'l'il i S 
p r o b a b l y in J a r g e measure BO because t h e c o u r t s r e c o g n i z e t h a t 
p o l i c e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n pi n r o d u r e s , wh i l e o f t e n l e n s than p e r f e c t , 
c) 1  e u s ua 11 y v a 11.1 v dl o u I 111 1 1 II 1 1 1 I II 1 a 11 i l 1,11 1 1 1 1 , e J |, so 
s u g g e s t i v e t h a t they cause iiiiiii 1 i l r n t i f i c a t i o n . Il 11 Simmons v . 
U n i t e d S t a t e n , Jus11 ce 11 a 1; I an conc 1 uded : 
Taken t o g e t h e r , t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s l e a v e 
l i t t l e room fo r doubt t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of Simmons was c o r r e c t , even though t h e 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e employed may have 
i n some r e s p e c t s f a l l e n s h o r t of t h e i d e a l . 
We h o l d t h a t i n t h e f a c t u a l s u r r o u n d i n g s of 
t h i s c a s e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e used 
was n o t such as t o deny Simmons due p r o c e s s 
of law or t o c a l l for r e v e r s a l under our 
s upe rv i so ry a uth o r 1 1 y . 
390 0 . S • at 3 85-86 (f oo111 o t e om i t t e d ) • H e • r e , a s i n 8 1 mmons, th e 
t h e po s s i b i 1 i t y o £ s u g g e s t i v e n e s s w a s by n c in e a 1 :i s s u b s t a n t i a l 
e n 0 U g h t o c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s under t h e F e d e r a l 
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Constitution. This Court1s analysis of this issue under the Utah 
Constitution should be no different. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO SPEAK IN HIS OWN BEHALF. 
At the end of h i s t r i a l , defendant personal ly asked 
that he be allowed to address the court . The court denied 
defendant's request , and defendant claims that h i s cons t i tu t iona l 
r ight s were thus v i o l a t e d . This argument has no merit . 
I t i s useful to s e t forth the relevant portion of the 
record in i t s e n t i r e t y . After defendant had taken the wi tness 
stand, after counsel had made t h e i r c los ing arguments, and after 
the court had rendered i t s verd ic t of g u i l t y , the fo l lowing 
d i scuss ion took p l a c e : 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN: Your Honor, may 
I say something? 
THE COURT: I don't want to hear from you. 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN: You don't even want 
to hear my statement and you are v i o l a t i n g my 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . I want to be sentenced 
now. 
THE COURT: All r i gh t , Mr. Shumate, you may want 
to ta lk to your c l i e n t . 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, Mr. Goodran and I have 
discussed t h i s matter in advance. He indicated to me 
that i f the Court found him g u i l t y , that he would 
request that the Court sentence him a t that t ime, 
in order that i t would enable an appeal to be 
taken d i r e c t l y . 
THE COURT: Al l r i gh t . Mr. Bruce Dal las 
Goodman, the Court having found you g u i l t y as 
charged, second-degree murder, a f i r s t - d e g r e e 
f e lony , I advise you again that that offense i s 
punishable by incarcerat ion in the Utah Sta te 
Prison for a period of time not l e s s than f i v e 
years but which may be for your natural l i f e ; 
in addi t ion to that a f ine up to $10,000 may be 
imposed, or both such f ine and imprisonment. 
Are you aware of that? 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN: I am aware of 
everything, y e s . 
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THE COURT: Have you t a l k e d t o your l awyer 
about t h a t ? 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN: Yes , 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . The law a l s o p r o v i d e s 
t h a t you a r e e n t i t l e d t o an a d d i t i o n a l per iod of 
t ime from,, the f i n d i n g of g u i l t y of murder i n the 
second d e g r e e f a f i r s t - d e g r e e f e l o n y , t o have the 
Court pass judgment and impose s e n t e n c e . That 
p e r i o d of t ime , as provided by law, i s not l e s s 
than two days but w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e . 
Knowing you have t h e r i g h t t o a d d i t i o n a l t i m e , 
knowing t h i s Court would grant you a d d i t i o n a l 
t i m e , you want t o wa ive t ime and p r o c e e d now, 
i s tha t c o r r e c t ? 
MR. SHUMATE: That i s t h e p o s i t i o n of my 
c l i e n t , y e s , sir, , 
T H E C O U R T : Mini II! i in i In i l l , '| u i i 
concur? 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN: 
THE COURT: All right, time waives ML w«r 
the law allows you to call witnesses in 
mitigation or: to make a statement in mitigation, 
either one c i: both. D o ] rou desire to do either 
one? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, your Hoi i six • 
THE COURT: No w i t n e s s e s ? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, s i r . 
THE COURT: No statement? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bruce D a l l a s Goodman, clc > 
y ou d e s i r e t o make any s t a t e m e n t ? 
BRUCE DALLAS GOODMAN: No. P roceed with the 
s e n t e n c e , p i e a s e . 
THE COU RT: All i i () 111 • Any t h i n g i n beha l f 
of t h e S t a t e ? 
M R . C H R I K T I A N S E f J I  111 il IIi il illi || • : , , ; 1 € • l I< i l ,. g , 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . No :i i si >i i t t a l ? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, s i r . 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , t l le m a t t e r hav ing 
been submit ted t o the Court and the Court ha wing 
determined you , Bruce D a l l a s Goodman, g u i l t y of 
murder i n the second d e g r e e , a f i r s t - d e g r e e 
f e l o n y , i t i s t h e s e n t e n c e of t h i s C o u r t t h a t — 
f i r s t , I judge you g u i l t y and I s e n t e n c e you 
t o t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n for a per iod of t ime of 
not l e s s than f i v e y e a r s but which may be f o r 
t h e r e s t of yoi ir n a t u r a l I i f e „ No f i n e . „ 
P pro fut i p g r t t h r e e roaf ionr why , l | i n CVjui • "'" ' 
e n d a n t i ii! IJUIIII nil lliini! lie wat» den i ed Huh tun " t i t u t u n i 
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F i r s t , there i s no indica t ion t h a t any of defendant 's 
cons t i tu t iona l r i gh t s were v io la t ed . UTAH CONST. Art. I , S 12 
and UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-1-6(1)(a) (1982), c i ted by defendant, 
p ro tec t the accused 's fundamental r igh t to a fa i r t r i a l . The 
accused i s e n t i t l e d to defend in person or by counsel, to t e s t i f y 
in h i s own behalf, to confront the witnesses agains t him, and to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in h i s behalf. In the 
proceedings below, defendant was afforded a l l of these basic 
r i g h t s . He t e s t i f i e d in h i s own behalf. Through counsel he made 
opening and closing statements to the cour t . He cross-examined 
the witnesses against him. And he compelled the attendance of 
witnesses from Utah, Cal ifornia and Florida to t e s t i f y in h i s 
behalf. Nothing in the provisions c i ted by defendant suggests 
tha t the t r i a l judge ' s author i ty to preserve the decorum of the 
proceeding i s abridged, or tha t the accused may stand and address 
the court whenever he pleases .8 Defendant had no so-cal led r ight 
to speak in h i s behalf tha t was v io la ted in these proceedings. 
Second, i t i s impossible to see how defendant could 
have been harmed by the ac t ions in the court below. The record 
r e f l e c t s t h a t , a f t e r Judge Burns to ld defendant he did not want 
to hear from him, defendant exclaimed, "You don ' t even want to 
hear iny statement and you are v io l a t i ng my cons t i tu t iona l r i g h t s . 
I want to be sentenced now." (T. 392). The court then spoke to 
8
 Standing a lone, Judge Burns appears t o have been cur t with 
defendant in saying, "No. I don ' t want to hear from you." An 
examination of the e n t i r e record, however, wil l show tha t Judge 
Burns was cooperative with defendant and his counsel and gave 
them every opportunity to present an adequate defense. 
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d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , counnel F t a t c d lllinil lie and del cndanL had 
d i s c u s s e d t h e maLtei and that, d e f e n d a n t wished In waivi the I i,me 
III mi ihc i i i l I ' l l * I I I I I I I in I II li i II i n I II li i III |||ii H e e r i e 11 II i e n t e m 1 i n q r 
II I II i MI III i .| d e f e n d a n t an o p p o r t u n i t y t o pur sen t ev idence or f n i . «* a 
i I t em e n t i n m i t i g a t i o n "111 111 , c I  i I i 1111 a n 1 w i J E. q i< i e n e x a t ™ t. 1 \ 
III ii.li i ' i ii in in in 1 II in II in 1 III I in III I in II II in in mi i III III in II in i II mi III i I mi > II ii 1 1 in in II I ill III I in mi II i II II mi II III mi in II i ill 
l u heei i 1 i turn tu rn d i d n o t h a i i n d e f e n d a n t a n d c o u l d n o t t i a v e 
ill1 I i > el i ill t h e f mi 11 c o m e of t h e c a s e , For t h i f i r e a s o n d e t e n d a r 
iii tj u nit ill in I mi ill1 ill in I i in II i I mi I j i i I IMI, i-i e e fa La I e v , J ' u c k e i MM 
3 1 3 , 3 1 6 ( U t a h 1 9 8 5 ) I t l i i i . C o m I w i l l i I i i i ' v e i r s e a c r i m i n a l 
c o i i v i c t i u i i , U I I 1 L - 1 J Lint e n o i "if* s ' n n i e t h i n q [ " s u b s t a n t i a l t ind 
p r e j u d i c i a l II mi I I I ih. i • 11 s ii • I h a 1 11 J H I in i mi . 11 i « «i s u i u I J I e 1 i. k iJI J I 
t h a i IIIIIII i t s a b s e n c e t h e r e would li i i been a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l 
And f J iiij I u n d a n t waived h i b inililL Lu r a i s e • l i s 
ifisiie on appea l lb) - a i l i n g t o make a p r o p e r o b j e c t i o n a t t i ~ ~ , 
Defendan t a s k e d to be s e n t e n c e d on the day of t r i a l , I t h i s wc 
mini IIII IIH ii ( f r i d r i i 11 i ii II ml n II if In in mi i I i n II I mi mi in i l I II i in ill 1 i | f c an a n r e s 
lie was s a t i s f i e d t h a t hifo r e q u e s t had bt en i i i t in tod . III delenddi i t 
b e l i e v e d t h a t Ih was beirui h i lined lb\ noiim l i n g e r i n g i IIIIIII I o p r i e t y , 
III i n in I n I I III i l l l i II II IIIIIII in i l l II ill i in II |„ 11 II 1 1 i I mi i I I I I I I I 1 I I I i I mi III II II i i I I I I I I I ill i i I I I I 11 1 1 
n v e n i e n t J > li n v c o r r e c t e d any d c l e i t . a t lllial | N I I rii . 
111 I I I I  I I mi I I ' B f a i l u r e t o o 1 > i p c t i m i I 111 i n 11 ml II»e 1 o w p r e c l u d e s h i s 
mi ' ' ' II i ii i i» nil IIIIIII in I i HI I II S t a t e u « o t f c u g i i 1 I I li I il '" ' 
254 1983) . 
CONCLUSION 
r
 ego i 
conviction should be affirmed. 
-ill--
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